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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
NoVEMER 1982

VOLUME 35

NUMBER 6

The Corporate Governance
Movement*
Daniel R. Fischel**
In the past decade a number of commentators have argued that
corporationshave failed to meet their responsibilities to shareholders
and the public. To remedy this perceived failure, these commentators
have advocated a variety of corporate governance proposals. In this
Article ProfessorFischelchallenges the notion that any problem exists
in the current mode of corporate governance. He contends that reformers have wrongly assumed the existence of a "problem" because of
their failure to understand the economic theory underlying the corporate form of firm organization. Professor Fischel argues further that
no empirical evidence exists to support the contentions of advocates of
corporateregulation.Consequently, he concludes that critics have leveled charges and proposed solutions to a problem that does not exist
to promote goals that are unrelated to the purpose of the corporation.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of corporate governance has received an enormous
amount of attention in the past ten years.1 Many academics, regu* The author would like to thank Frank H. Easterbrook for his helpful comments. The
assistance of Michael Timmers, Northwestern 1982, is also gratefully acknowledged.
** Professor of Law, Northwestern University;, Visiting Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. B.A. 1972, Cornell; M.A. 1974, Brown; J.D. 1977, The Un'versity of Chicago.

1. The literature is too voluminous to cite in detail. For representative statements, see
Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of CorporateMisconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099 (1977); Dent, The Revolution in
Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board, and the Director'sDuty of Care, 61 B.U.L.
Rzv. 623 (1981); Schwartz, Towards New CorporateGoals: Co-Existence With Society, 60
Gao. L.J. 57 (1971); Soderquist Reconciling Shareholders'Rights and CorporateResponsibility: Close and Small Public Corporations,33 VAND. L. Rav. 1387 (1980); Weiss, Social

Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance System to Resolve
an InstitutionalImpasse, 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 343 (1981); Weiss & Schwartz, Using Disclosure to Activate the Board of Directors,41 LAw &CoNrms. Pons. 63 (Summer 1977). See
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lators, and even businessmen themselves have concluded that
something is "wrong" with the way the corporation is governed.
Characterizations such as "breakdown in accountability," "widespread illegality," and "lack of legitimacy" have become commonplace. To rectify this dismal state of affairs, commentators have
proposed a wide variety of solutions, including a requirement of a
stated percentage of independent directors, increased shareholder
democracy, and stricter enforcement of fiduciary duties. Critics
also have advanced various methods of making corporations more
"socially responsible." Several law review symposia 2 and numerous
conferences" have been dedicated to discussion of these reforms.
Bills have been introduced in Congress that would have implemented many of the reform proposals.4 In 1980 the Securities and
Exchange Commission published an exhaustive document entitled
"Staff Report on Corporate Accountability" 5 discussing the perceived problem and many of the proposed solutions. Even more
recently the American Law Institute issued the long-awaited first
draft of its report on corporate governance, which prescribes various changes in the structure of the corporation and in corporation
law.
I argue in this Article that the arguments of those who advocate the need for a change in corporate governance are based on a
failure to understand the economics of the corporate form of firm
organization and are unsupported by any empirical evidence. No
evidence exists, for example, to support the widespread claim that
the present system of corporate governance operates to the detriment of investors or society as a whole. Even less reason exists to
believe that any of the proposed reforms will improve the relative
position of investors or society as a whole. The far more plausible
hypothesis, once the relevant economic theory and evidence are
also R.

NADER, M. GREEN & SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); C. STONE,
WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975).
2. See, e.g., Symposium: Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1247

(1979); Symposium on Corporate Governance, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1979).
3. See, e.g., COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE: THE ALI-ABA
SYMPoSIuMs 1977-1978 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTARIES]; Ailie
House Symposium, An In-Depth Analysis of Federaland State Roles in Regulating Corporate Management, 31 Bus. LAW. 859 (1976).
4. S.2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) ("Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of
1980"); H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) ("Corporate Democracy Act of 1980").
5.

STAFF

OF SECURITIES

AND

EXCHANGE

COMMISSION,

CORPORATE

ACCOUNTABILITY

(Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE ACCOUNTABI.ITY].
6. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT
MENDATIONS

(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982).
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properly understood, is that there is no systematic defect in corporate governance.
Since much of the corporate governance movement reflects a
lack of understanding of the economics of the corporate form of
firm organization, I discuss the theory of the firm in Part II. With
this foundation I argue in Part III that there is no problem in corporate governance that needs to be addressed. The remainder of
the paper demonstrates the problems with the different proposals
that have been advanced to improve corporate governance. Part IV
discusses the concept of corporate social responsibility and concludes that .the term is empty of content. Part V criticizes the frequent proposals for increased shareholder democracy. Part VI analyzes the likely effect of mandatory independent directors and
various committees that have been advocated. Finally, Part VII
questions whether shareholders' welfare would be increased if directors were held liable more frequently for breaches of fiduciary
duty.

I.

THE CORPORATE FORM OF FIRM ORGANIZATION
A.

The Theory of the Firm

Firms and markets are alternative modes of organizing economic activity.7 Thus the entrepreneur interested in engaging in a
particular form of economic activity, say selling legal services, has
a basic choice to make. One possibility is to enter into separate
contractual agreements with a series of individuals knowledgable
in law to provide expertise whenever problems arise. The entrepeneur also would have to enter into separate contracts with
typists, word processors, copiers, messengers, and other necessary
personnel. All of these factors would be paid per unit of output. By
entering into these separate exchange transactions in the market,
the entrepreneur is able to sell legal services to others.
Because of the costs associated with separately negotiating
each of these contracts, the entrepreneur may choose an alternative to a series of market exchanges-the firm. The entrepreneur
interested in providing legal services, in other words, can hire lawyers, secretaries, and other factors of production necessary to pro7. See Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. ECON. REv. 777, 777 (1972); Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386
(1937), reprinted in READINGS IN PRICE THEORY 331, 333 (G. Stigler & K. Boulding eds.
1952); Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution Attributes, 19 J. EcON.
Lrr. 1537, 1539 (1981).
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duce legal services. While relationships with these factors of production in the firm remain contractual, an employer-employee
relationship is substituted for a series of complicated exchange
transactions in the market. The firm itself is a legal fiction that
serves as a nexus for this contracting process. 8
Many business ventures require large amounts of capital-amounts larger than the entrepreneur realistically could provide or borrow from a bank-in addition to labor. In these situations the firm typically will sell divisible residual claims on the
assets and cash flows of the firm in exchange for capital. This is in
essence a description of the modern publicly held corporation.
Shareholders and bondholders provide firms with needed capital in
exchange for an expected rate of return generated by cash flows
from the firm's assets. Different groups provide other factors of
production: employees supply labor, managers supply managerial
talent necessary for coordinating the various inputs, and suppliers
supply goods. The publicly held corporation, therefore, is a type of
firm that facilitates the organization of production which is particularly effective when a large amount of capital is required.
B. Agency Costs Inherent in the CorporateForm of Firm
Organization
The corporate form of firm organization has obvious advantages for shareholders (suppliers of capital) and managers." Shareholders can participate in the gains from entrepreneurial ventures
even though they lack management skills; managers can pursue
profitable business opportunities even though they lack large personal wealth. Both parties benefit from this division of labor.
Certain costs, however, are inherent in this relationship. As
residual claimants on the firm's income stream, shareholders want
their agents-the firm's managers-to maximize wealth. Because
managers cannot capture all of the gains if they are successful, and
will not suffer all of the losses should the venture flop, they have
less incentive to maximize wealth than if they themselves were the
principals. Rather, managers have an incentive to consume excess
leisure, perquisites and in general be less dedicated to the goal of
wealth maximization than they would be if they were not simply
8. Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FiN. EcoN. 305, 311 (1976).

9. Although I confine my discussion to shareholders and managers, one can generalize
the analysis to include other parties (such as employees) who contract voluntarily with the
firm.
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agents. 10
Since this conflict of interest is known, and thus will affect the
price managers can charge for their services and the price shareholders will pay for shares, both groups have an interest in minimizing any costs attributable to this divergence of interest. If
agency costs can be reduced by direct monitoring, for example, the
advantageous course for all concerned may be to hire monitors (independent accountants or directors) to limit nonwealth-maximizing behavior by manager-agents.1 1 In addition to direct monitoring,
managerial contracts can provide managers with incentives to max12
imize shareholders' welfare.
The market also plays a valuable role in minimizing agency
costs. When a firm is profitable, the price of its shares will be high
relative to comparable firms that are less efficiently run.1 3 This basic proposition has dramatic implications for the incentives of corporate managers to maximize the firm's profits. Since managers'
compensation typically is positively correlated with profitability,
they have strong incentives to operate efficiently and keep stock
prices high.14 More generally, managers have strong incentives to
maximize the market value of their own services within the firm
and to other possible employers. Managers can accomplish this objective by creating wealth for stockholders. Since managers work in
teams, however, poor performance by some members of the team
can affect adversely the fortunes of other members. Thus, managers have incentives to monitor each other to maximize the value of
10. Thus agency costs are in no way unique to corporations but are inherent in any
agency relationship.
11. A firm's agency costs include monitoring costs that arise from the agency relationship, as well as the agent's bonding expenditures and the residual loss attributable to the
divergence in interest between principals and agents. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8,
at 308.
12. See Diamond & Verrecchia, Optimal ManagerialContracts and Equilibrium Security Prices, 37 J. FIN. 275 (1982).
13. The difference in the price of shares is a direct implication of the efficient capital
markets hypothesis, which posits that all information which is publicly available about a
firm is rapidly and without bias incorporated in the firm's share prices. For a discussion of
this theory, and the substantial empirical evidence supporting it, see Easterbrook & Fischel,
The ProperRole of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L.

REv. 1161, 1165-68 (1981).
14. See W. L&WELLEN, THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT (1971); Ciscel & Carroll, The Determinants of Executive Salaries: An Econometric Survey, 62 Rxv. ECON. &
STAT. 7 (1980); Lewellen & Huntsman, ManagerialPay and CorporatePerformance,60 Am.
EcoN. REv. 710, 716 (1979). These studies conclude that a strong positive correlation exists
between executives' compensation and profits and the share price performances of their
companies.
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their own services. 15

The product and capital markets also constrain the divergence
of interests between managers and investors. A firm that is inefficiently run will have a difficult time selling goods and services on
the same terms as more efficiently run firms. Similarly, the poorly
run firm will be at a disadvantage in raising equity capital. Even if
the inefficient firm does not resort to the new equities market for
needed capital, it still is at a disadvantage when negotiating with
other sources of capital such as banks. In addition, if the price of a
firm's shares falls too low relative to what it would be under superior management, an outsider may attempt to acquire the firm by
merger or tender offer and install new managers. The operation of
this market for corporate control simultaneously gives managers of
all firms who wish to avoid a takeover an incentive to operate efficiently and to keep share prices high and provides a mechanism for
displacing inefficient managers.16
Finally, legal rules can operate to reduce agency costs. As an
alternative or complement to hiring direct monitors, investors and
managers could enter into contractual arrangements designed to
minimize divergence of interests. But since the number of situations in which a divergence of interests can occur is very large, and
because an investor cannot anticipate all of these situations in advance, this type of contracting would be very costly. The imposition by the law of fiduciary duties serves as an alternative or a
supplement to hiring direct monitors or writing lengthy and complicated contracts. 7 Optimal fiduciary duties should approximate
the bargain that investors and managers would reach if transactions costs were zero. Thus fiduciary duties proscribe theft and
otherwise constrain the actions of managers in the situations in
which conflicts of interest are likely to arise. Fiduciary duties
serve, in other words, as a standard form contractual term in every
agency contract.
15. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
16. Easterbrook & Fischel, supranote 13, at 1169-74; Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover
Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAw. 1733, 1735-37 (1981);
Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for CorporateControl, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tax. L. Rav. 1, 9 (1978). These articles build on Henry
Manne's seminal article, Manne, Mergers and the Market for CorporateControl, 73 J. POL.
EcON. 110 (1965).
17. This point is discussed in detail in Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 702 (1982). For a discussion of how the rules of voting in
corporate law also are designed to reduce agency costs, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in
Corporate Law, - J. LAw & ECON. (forthcoming) (April 1983).
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This combination of direct monitoring, market forces, and legal rules all operate greatly to reduce divergence of interests between investors and managers. Doubtless some divergence will remain, and managers will not always act in the investors' best
interest. But the gains from the division of labor inherent in the
corporate form of firm organization outweigh the resulting loss to
investors."' Any attempt to reduce any remaining divergence even
further must take into account not only the gains from this reduction, but also the costs, both direct and indirect, that methods of
further reduction will impose.
III. Is

THERE A PROBLEM IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THAT

NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED?

Given the sweeping nature of many of the reforms proposed,
one would expect that advocates of reform have a well developed
theory of the problem. But no such theory exists. Most reformers
simply have assumed the existence of a problem without specifying
precisely what the problem is. 1 ' When the existence of a problem is
discussed, it is frequently in terms of vague references to lack of
accountablilty to shareholders or to society as a whole. Some complain that management is entrenched and not sufficiently dedicated to the goal of maximizing shareholders' wealth;20 others complain that managements' single-minded dedication to profit
maximization is inconsistent with social welfare.21 The failure to

recognize that management cannot be at the same time too little
and too much dedicated to profit maximization is itself a strong
indictment of the corporate governance movement. More fundamentally, proponents of reforms in corporate governance have
failed to demonstrate the existence of any problem of any kind,
whether defined as accountability to shareholders or to society as a
whole.
18. If this were not the case, people would not form corporations.
19. The first draft of the American Law Institute Restatement on corporate governance, for example, advocates sweeping changes in the structure of corporations and in corporation law without ever clearly articulating how the present system prejudices investors. See
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRucTuRE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6.
20. See, e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974). See also Blumberg, A Need for Supplementary NationalLegislation,
in COMMENTARIES, supra note 3, at 343; Ratner, Regulating Management Through Corporation Law, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 3, at 138.
21. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 1; Schwartz, supra note 1.
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Accountability to Shareholders

What does it mean to state that managers lack accountability
to shareholders? Surely this characterization does not mean that
managers, because of the conflict of interest intrinsic in their relationship with shareholders, will not always act in the shareholders'
best interests. Agency costs, as discussed above, are an inevitable
consequence of every agency relationship and are outweighed by
the gains resulting from an efficient division of labor. Moreover,
even if agency costs are substantial-an unlikely prospect because
of the market forces giving managers incentives to maximize
wealth-shareholders will not be injured if relevant information is
incorporated in market prices.22
What then is the problem? One of the few attempts to define
the existence of a problem appears in the Staff Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Corporate Accountability.
According to the Report, the 1970's witnessed a breakdown in accountability to shareholders, which was evidenced by "the collapse
of several major companies, the hundreds of corporations involved
in questionable payments, and corporate noncompliance with envi"23
ronmental and other laws ....
The Report is cloaked in the familiar guise of "shareholder
protection" and "accountability to investors" to the exclusion of
other goals.2 4 It is clear, however, that the Commission has totally
22. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
Consider two firms, A and B, that are identical in all respects except for the quality of
management. Firm A is extremely well managed and efficient. The managers of firm B are
lazy, consume excessive perquisites, and are only marginally competent in those rare occa-

sions when they dedicate themselves to profit maximization. At first blush, the shareholders
of firm B may appear to be victims of inferior management. In fact, however, there is no

reason to believe that the shareholders of firm B will be worse off. The poor management of
firm B will cause the price of its shares to fall relative to those of firm A to the point at
which the expected returns (assuming equivalent systematic risk) are identical. Whether
every investor of the two firms is aware of the difference in management is irrelevant. So

long as the information is imbedded in the respective market prices, as it almost certainly
would be in an efficient market such as the American stock markets, shareholders of both
firms are fully protected. See Fischel, The Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities
Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. (Nov. 1982) (forthcoming)
for a discussion of how investors, even naive investors, are protected by an efficient market
in securities. See also Fischel, The Law and Economics of Dividend Policy, 67 VA. L. REV.
699, 718-19 (1981).
23. CORPORATE AcCOUNTABILrry, supra note 5, at 29.

24. The Report states that it "is, first and foremost, about accountability of the corporation to shareholders and investors." Id. at 33. The Report dismisses accountability to society as a whole as an issue that "transcend[s] the jurisdiction and expertise of this Commission and appropriately should be considered by others." Id.
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blurred the fundamental distinction between conduct that is detrimental to investors-theft, for example-and conduct that may be
morally objectionable to some but beneficial to investors.2" Of the
three types of evidence offered to demonstrate the breakdown in
accountability, only the first, major financial collapses, is of any
special interest to shareholders qua shareholders. Since the other
two categories, questionable foreign payments and noncompliance
with environmental laws, in all probability are explainable as attempts by managers to boost profitability, shareholders are far
more likely to be beneficiaries of these practices rather than victims. The Commission is simply disingenuous in its reliance on
practices undertaken to benefit investors as evidence of a "breakdown" of accountability to this same group. If anything, the widespread practice of these alleged "abuses" proves precisely the opposite proposition from that stressed in the Report-that
managers are in the main fully dedicated to the goal of maximizing
shareholders' wealth, and no regulatory intervention in this regard
is needed.26
This leaves the Report's emphasis on financial collapse, about
which several things can be said. It is ludicrous for the Report to
assume that financial collapses are attributable to a "breakdown"
in corporate accountability as opposed to real economic forces
without any supporting evidence. No one would seriously argue, for
example, that the current problems facing the United States automobile and steel industries are due primarily to the lack of "meaningful shareholder participation," one of the panaceas emphasized
in the Report. Real economic forces such as the escalating price of
oil, plant obsolescence, and high labor costs are much more likely
to have caused the problems in these industries. To attribute these
difficulties to a "breakdown" in corporate accountability is a colossal nonsequitur. It would make as much sense to attribute the poor
performance of the stock market in recent years to the proliferation of independent directors during this period.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that financial collapses are as
25. The Commission is not alone in blurring this distinction. See, e.g., Feis, Is Shareholder Democracy Attainable?, 31 Bus. LAW. 621, 621-22 (1976) ("It is apparent, as one
surveys the constant stream of shareholder suits, massive write-downs of assets, criticism of
corporate financial reporting, news about illegal and immoral political contributions, international bribery, kickback and payoff arrangements, that too many managements exercise
uncontrolled power and take unfair advantage of the shareholders they purport to serve.").
26. See Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and
Means Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L. Rlv. 388, 413-14 (1977).
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pressing a concern to shareholders as may first appear. The price
of a firm's shares at any given time reflects a variety of different
possible future outcomes. Thus a share of stock with a ninety percent chance of going to zero in the future and a ten percent chance
of going to twenty should, ignoring risk, sell at two dollars. An investor who purchases the stock at two dollars and then watches it
fall to zero will not be cheated, any more than an investor who
purchased the same stock would receive an undeserved windfall if
the stock went to twenty dollars. The investor's primary concern is
whether information regarding the risk of collapse is available at
the time of the investment decision. In an efficient market this risk
is incorporated in market prices. Investors who purchase at this
price are compensated ex ante for the prospect of a financial collapse ex post.
A related reason why shareholders as a class are not that concerned about the prospect of financial collapse is that shareholders
of one firm may prosper from the misfortunes of another firm.
Thus, when a Braniff announces bankruptcy, shareholders of other
airline companies who inherit valuable routes rejoice (assuming no
new entry). The risk averse shareholder who wishes to avoid the
risk that a firm will go bankrupt has the option of holding a diversified portfolio. Therefore, any of Braniff's shareholders who feared
financial collapse could have purchased shares of other airline companies. Gains in holdings of other companies would have offset the
losses from holdings in Braniff; the bankruptcy of Braniff therefore
would have been a matter of indifference. Thus the option of diversification, an option available to every investor, greatly minimizes investors' concern with financial collapse.
B.

Accountability to Society

It has become fashionable to argue that the pursuit of profit
maximization by corporations is at variance with the public interest.28 Proponents of this argument, however, face the insuperable
27.

The importance of diversification in a variety of contexts is discussed in Easter-

brook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35

STAN.

L.

REV.

(Nov. 1982)

(forthcoming); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,supra note 17, at

711-14; Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 Am. BAR
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1, 9-13; Langbein & Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79
MICH. L. REV. 72, 79-92 (1980). For a more technical but accessible discussion of diversification, see J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKE: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 171-266
(1973).

28. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 1, at 345 ("profit maximization is increasingly at variance with the standards by which American society judges corporations' contribution to the
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problem of defining what the public interest is, and when the pursuit of profit maximization should be sacrificed for these ends. As
Harold Demsetz has remarked, centuries of philosophers and economists have tried and failed to provide any workable definition of
"the fair price," "the just wage," or "fair competition," let alone
what constitutes "the good society." 9 I do not even attempt to follow this path. My purpose is far more modest-to demonstrate
that the arguments of those who claim that corporations are not
"socially responsible" have failed to make out a prima facie case.
Although potential conflict exists between profit maximization
and pursuit of other goals, far more consistency is present between
the two than generally assumed. A successful business venture provides jobs to workers and goods and services that consumers want
to buy. While these benefits may not appear to be particularly dramatic, they should not be underestimated, as the tens of thousands
of workers in distressed industries who have had to give back concessions previously won or have lost their jobs outright will readily
attest. Much the same is true in other areas. Critics commonly assume, for example, that profit maximization is inconsistent with
other goals such as providing safe working conditions or maintaining a clean environment. These other goals, however, are most
likely to be sacrificed precisely in those times when firms are not
profitable because of a perception that the costs they impose are
too high. Substantial overlap exists, therefore, between the pursuit
of profit maximization and other social goals.
Frequently this harmony of interests exists, but is difficult to
perceive. Firms that close plants to move to different geographical
areas commonly are accused, for example, of lacking a sense of responsibility to affected workers and the community as a whole.
The difficulty with this argument is that it ignores the presumably
greater benefits that will accrue to workers and the community in
the new locale where the firm can operate more profitably. A firm
that causes dislocations by moving a plant is behaving no more
"unethically" than a firm that causes dislocations by, say, inventing a new technology that causes competitors to go out of
business.3 0
I do not mean to suggest that profit maximization will always
public welfare.").
29. Demsetz, Social Responsibility in the EnterpriseEconomy, 10 Sw. U.L. Rav. 1, 1
(1978).
30. See Lorie, An Economist's PerceptionI: A View on the Need to Revise Corporation Statutes, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 3, at 51, 53.
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lead to the socially optimal result. In those situations in which externalities are present-pollution is the most common example-a
firm may impose costs on others without providing compensation.
But even this situation is misunderstood. If a firm dumps pollutants in a stream, the firm imposes costs on the users of the stream
that may exceed the benefits to the firm. It does not follow, however, that pollution is immoral behavior which should be halted.
Consider the reciprocal case in which the firm does not pollute because of concern for users of the stream and instead relies on a
more expensive method of disposing wastes. In this situation the
users of the stream impose costs on the firm's investors, employees,
and consumers that may exceed the benefits to users of the stream.
Neither polluting nor failing to pollute is a priori the "ethically" or
"morally" correct course of action. The difficulty is establishing a
property right in the stream so that the ultimate result will duplicate what the parties would have bargained for had they been able
to do so at no cost.3 1 While this itself is a complicated task, it is
necessary regardless of what corporate governance structure exists,
or, for that matter, regardless of the type of society involved.3 2 To
view pollution as a question of corporate governance, therefore,
only serves to obscure the relevant issues.
In still other cases, such as sensitive foreign payments, some
may view profit maximization as inconsistent with a general moral
sense of proper behavior. The moral argument, however, is not
clear-cut because of the competing goal of making domestic companies effective competitors abroad, which increases trade and,
hence, provides benefits to consumers, workers, investors, and the
economy as a whole. Indeed, the same tradeoffs are evident in virtually all of the pet programs of those who argue that corporations
are not socially responsible-from avoiding investment in South
Africa or other countries to making safer products.3 2 At the very
least, the moral arguments are sufficiently unclear that the failure
of corporations to act in a manner desired by certain reformers
cannot be reasonably described as a "breakdown" in accountability
31. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19-28 (1960).
32. As Michael Dooley has pointed out, Soviet plants pollute as much or more than
those in America but produce goods and services in lesser numbers and of inferior quality.
Dooley, Controlling Giant Corporations:The Question of Legitimacy, in CoRPoRATE GovERNANCE: PAST

AND

FUTURE 28, 30 (H. Manne ed. 1982).

33. For a discussion of the lack of consensus on any of the goals advanced by proponents of increased corporate social responsibility, see Engel, An Approach to CorporateSocial Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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or a defect in the way corporations are governed. Under these circumstances the proper course for those who believe in the moral
soundness of their positions is to seek redress through the political
process and not to attempt to disrupt the voluntary arrangements
that private parties have entered into in forming corporations. It
appears that it is only because the proponents of reform have
largely failed in implementing their objectives through the political
processes that they have turned to attempting to achieve these
same objectives by altering the governance of corporations.
Perhaps all that can be said is that when a restriction on corporate conduct is embodied in a statute, it should be obeyed. Laws
currently exist that restrict pollution,3' 4 foreign payments,3 5 and anticompetitive behavior 6 as well as other practices; when these laws
are violated an argument could be made that a breakdown in accountability has occurred. But even here the situation is more
complicated than may first appear. Because many laws can be violated inadvertently or by subordinates, the costs of preventing violations may far exceed the gains from avoiding violations.3 7 A firm
may also find it advantageous to violate a law deliberately and pay
the penalty for the same reason that an individual in some cases
may prefer to breach a contract and pay damages.33 Because the
gains from breach or violation presumably exceed the social costs
(as reflected in the penalty), compliance with the statute or contract is undesirable from a personal as well as a social perspective.
The optimal level of violations of law, therefore, is not zero. The
remedy for those who believe that the level of violations is too high
is to seek to increase the penalty to reflect the "real" social costs of
the activity.39 Once again, however, the solution to the problem,
assuming one exists, is in the political process, not in changing the
governance of corporations.
34. E.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1978).
35. E.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to dd-2
(1981).
36. E.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976).
37. This point is well illustrated in Engel, supra note 33, at 12-18.
38. For a further discussion of this point, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits
by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1156-59 (1982).
39. I do not here discuss the interesting issue whether the increase in penalty should
be levied on the firm exclusively or on the firm and its agents. Compare Posner, Optimal
Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 Am. Cram. L. REV. 409 (1980) (penalties should be
imposed on the firm exclusively) with Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick:" An
Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of CorporatePunishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386
(1981) (emphasizing the need to punish the firm's agents).
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C. The Problem of the Nirvana Fallacy
Thus far I have argued that no evidence exists of any problem
in need of reform. But even if some problem could be demonstrated, it would not necessarily follow that reform is desirable.
Those who purport to discover discrepancies between an ideal
norm and existing imperfect institutional arrangements and then
conclude that existing arrangements should be displaced, commit
40
the nirvana fallacy well known in economic literature.
The relevant comparison is not between the ideal and the real,
but between different institutional arrangements. Thus one cannot
conclude that regulation is superior to the operation of markets
because markets are imperfect-regulation may be, and in most
cases is likely to be, more imperfect. Similarly, it is a form of the
nirvana fallacy to conclude that the structure of corporations or
corporation law should be changed because existing institutional
arrangements are imperfect. The proper comparison is between the
costs and benefits of existing arrangements and the alternatives
being proposed. Since corporations are products of voluntary contractual agreements, a strong presumption, as discussed more fully
in following sections, exists in favor of the superiority of existing
arrangements.
IV.

CORPORATE SociAL RESPONSIBILITY

Perhaps the most time-honored debate in all of corporate law
is: For whom are managers trustees? 41 Under the traditional view
managers are trustees solely for the firm's investors; under the alternative approach they are trustees for a far broader set of constituents including society as a whole. Even if no breakdown in
corporate accountability to noninvestor groups has occurred, managers, under this alternative view, are free to pursue goals that do
not maximize shareholders' welfare if they believe the public interest is served. I examine this argument and the implications of state
chartering of corporations below.
40. The nirvana fallacy is discussed in Demsetz, Information & Efficiency: Another
Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969).
41. The debate is at least as old as the famous Berle-Dodd debates of the 1930's. See
Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1931); Berle, For
Whom CorporateManagers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1365 (1932); Dodd, For
Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932).
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Corporate Social Responsibility

and the Theory of the Firm
Those who argue that corporations have a social responsibility
and, therefore, that managers have the right, and perhaps the
duty, to consider the impact of their decisions on the public interest assume that corporations are capable of having social or moral
obligations. This is a fundamental error. A corporation, as discussed above, is nothing more than a legal fiction that serves as a
nexus for a mass of contracts which various individuals have voluntarily entered into for their mutual benefit. Since it is a legal
fiction, a corporation is incapable of having social or moral obligations much in the same way that inanimate objects are incapable
of having these obligations. Only people can have moral obligations
or social responsibilities, and only people bear the costs of
nonwealth-maximizing behavior.4 '
Participants on both sides of the debate on for whom are managers trustees have failed adequately to appreciate that the issue is
not one of public policy but of contract law. Viewed as a contract
issue, the question can be analyzed in much more concrete terms.
Do investors, as long as corporations lawfully may be formed for
profit, have any duty to sacrifice profitable opportunities to benefit
some other parties? And do managers, acting as agents for investors, have any right or duty to sacrifice profitable opportunities to
benefit some other party? 4" Both questions have the same an-

swer-managers should act to maximize the wealth of investors
pursuant to the terms of the contract of their agency relationship.
B. The Relevance of State Chartering
Commentators sometimes argue that the issue of corporate social responsibility depends on whether the corporation is a creature
of the state or the product of private contract. 44 Because the corporation is a particular type of firm formed by individuals acting voluntarily and for their mutual benefit, it can far more reasonably be
42. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 38, at 1177; Jensen & Meckling, supra note
8, at 31.
43. The analysis does not change if managers are viewed as agents for employees or
other groups that have entered into contractual arrangements with the firm. Employees
have no duty to accept lower wages than they bargain for, and managers, if they are acting
as the employees' agents, have no right to pursue their own notions of the public interest at
the employees' expense.
44. For a thorough discussion of this debate, see R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION

15-22 (1979).
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viewed as the product of private contract than as a creature of the
state. Much of corporation law, including fiduciary duties and limitations on distributions for the protection of creditors, can be
viewed as standard form contractual provisions that would be negotiated by private contract if not provided by statute. Other typical provisions of corporate law, however, such as limited liability in
tort cases, could not be negotiated by private contract. To this extent, corporations have attributes that would not exist absent state
statutes. But this does not make corporations creatures of the
state. Limited liability in tort cases is more accurately viewed as a
subsidy to encourage a certain type of private conduct, forming
corporations (particularly close corporations in which corporate
governance is not an issue), than as a creation of the conduct itself.
The more important point, however, is that the debate concerning whether the corporation is a creature of the state or the
product of private contract is largely irrelevant to the issue of corporate social responsibility. Regardless of which way the corporation is viewed, the state is free to set limits on its actions. The
state, for example, could require corporations to pursue ends other
than wealth maximization or, at the extreme, outlaw corporations
altogether. But states have not done so nor have they made it unlawful to form corporations for profit. State chartering of corporations, therefore, in no way interferes with managers' contractual
duty to maximize wealth for investors.
V.

SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY

Shareholders under state law have the power to elect directors,'4 5 approve fundamental corporate changes,"4 and in certain

limited situations, initiate action such as the removal of directors.'7
Shareholders have the right under federal law to have shareholder
proposals included in the proxy material subject to certain limitations.48 Federal law also mandates that large amounts of informa-

tion be disclosed to shareholders to facilitate intelligent voting decisions. 49 Despite these rights and powers, most shareholders have
45. See, e.g., annotations to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1974 & Supp. 1980).
46. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1974).
47. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (1974 & Supp. 1980) (shareholders' power to
amend corporate charters); id., §§ 251-58 (shareholders' powers in consolidation and
merger).
48. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1981) (setting forth eligibility and timing requirements
and limits on number and length of proposals).
49. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1981) (corporation required to furnish shareholders au-
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little interest in running the corporation's affairs.6 0 Shareholders
routinely elect and reelect management's nominees for directors;
shareholder proposals rarely get more than a trivial percentage of
the vote.
This lack of shareholder involvement in corporate governance
has led the Securities and Exchange Commission and others to
question "whether the present corporate governance system retains
its legitimacy in the absence of shareholder participation. 51 These
observers view the shareholders lack of interest as a "reflection of
frustration with the powerlessness of the role of the shareholder/
investor. ' 52 Shareholders, in other words, would welcome "meaningful" participation if they believed that their votes or views
would have any impact on corporate policy. To revitalize corporate
democracy-and thereby "significantly enhance" corporate accountability 5s-a variety of reforms have been proposed. These
range from allowing shareholders to nominate their own candidates
for office, 5 ' or at the very least having their nominations considered by nominating committees consisting entirely of independent
directors,55 to requiring increased disclosure about nominees for office and management conduct.56 Reformers have also recomdited balance sheets, audited statements of income and changes in financial position, a list
of officers and directors, market price of issuer's common stock, and related security-holder
matters).
50. For an explanation of why the rational shareholder prefers to remain passive, see
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 1171. See also Hetherington, When the Sleeper
Wakes: Reflections on Corporate Governance and ShareholderRights, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.

183, 184-88 (1979) (shareholders uninterested in increased participation); Kripke, The SEC.
Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW. 173, 175-78 (1981) (stockholder
does not think of himself as a partial owner of corporation but as holder of an investment
contract with corporation).
51. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 5, at 67.
52. Id.
53.

S.E.C. Rel. No. 16, 356 (Nov. 21, 1979), quoted in

CORPORATE

ACCOUNTABILITY,

supra note 5, at 68.
54. See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
(1976).
55.

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOM-

MENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 97-106; CoRPoRATE ACCOUNTABILrY, supra note 5, at 115-19;

ABA, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Corporate Director's Guidebook,
33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1625-26 (1978); ABA, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, Comm. on Corporate Laws, The Overview Committees of the Board of Directors,34
Bus. LAW. 1837, 1844 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Overview Committees]; ABA, Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation-Statementof the Business Roundtable, 33
Bus. LAW. 2083, 2107-09 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Business Roundtable].
56. See, e.g., Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, Disclosure of Information Bearing on Management Integrity and Competency, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 555 (1981); Weiss & Schwartz, supra
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mended that steps be taken to force institutional investors to take
elections of directors more seriously because "more exacting judgments with respect to the election of directors may improve corporate accountability and long-term profitability.

57

The literature on shareholder democracy illustrates the more
general defects in the corporate governance movement. After assuming the existence of a problem in corporate governance, advocates then assume that the problem could be eliminated or greatly
reduced if the demand of shareholders for more involvement in
running corporations were satisfied. As I discuss below, this latter
assumption is, if anything, more implausible than the assumption
that a problem exists. Further, generalizing from the example of
the shareholder proposal rule, I argue that the real beneficiaries of
shareholder democracy are not shareholders at all, but rather regulators and reformers.
A.

ShareholderDemocracy and the Theory of the Firm

The fundamental error of the proponents of shareholder democracy is their failure to recognize that no reason exists why investors, who provide the firm with capital in anticipation of receiving a certain rate of return generated by the firm's assets, should
have any input into the firm's decisionmaking processes.5 8 On the
contrary, investors are willing to supply capital, as opposed to
starting and operating the enterprise themselves, precisely because
they trust the expertise of professional managers. Moreover, the
rational (risk-averse) shareholder may well attempt to diversify his
portfolio by investing in many firms or in a mutual fund. 59 The
investor who holds securities in multiple firms is unlikely to have
the interest or expertise to participate in running any particular
firm. The genius of the modern corporation, which the proponents
of shareholder democracy overlook or misunderstand, is that it enables individuals who have wealth but lack managerial ability to
invest while simultaneously allowing professional managers who
lack personal wealth to run enterprises.8 0 Shareholders would be
note 1.
57.

CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 5, at 422.

58. See Fama, supra note 15; Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's CorporationLaw, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913, 918
(1982).

59. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
60. See Dooley, supra note 32, at 38 ("The limited governance role assigned to shareholders is intentional and is, in fact, the genius of the corporate form"); Easterbrook &
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hurt rather than helped if they were given more power, which no
doubt explains why they show no enthusiasm for the constant proposals to increase their role."
Other reasons also explain why one may not realistically expect shareholders to participate willingly in corporate governance.
Even if a shareholder discovers something "wrong" with the way
the corporation is managed, he has little incentive to resort to the
corporate voting machinery for redress. To have any chance of success, such an attempt would entail the expenditure of time, effort,
and money to educate other shareholders of the discovery. If a fullfledged proxy fight resulted, the costs would be substantial. But
the shareholder-monitor would have great difficulty in recouping
these costs because the benefits from improved performance inure
to each investor according to the size of his investment, not according to whether he was responsible for the improvement. Because of
this free-rider problem, most shareholders lack incentives to expend resources to become informed in elections or to wage proxy
contests.2 If a shareholder is dissatisfied, the more logical course
in most cases is simply to sell one's shares."3 This ability freely to
sell shares as an alternative to the difficulties inherent in shareholder voting, and not the lack of a "meaningful" opportunity to
participate, explains why shareholders prefer to remain passive.
Selling shares is the rational thing to do."
Reformers express a curious disdain for the market in shares,
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,supra note 17, at 700.

61. For a discussion of the lack of enthusiasm that investors have shown for an increased role in corporate governance, see Hetherington, supra note 50, at 184-88.
62. For a discussion of the role of voting in corporate law and its limitations, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 17.
63. A theory of the choice between voting and selling out is articulated in A. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970). Professor Hirschman argues that as the exit option
becomes more available, the importance of voice or voting diminishes. Because it is hard to
imagine a more available exit option than the liquid market in shares, Professor Hirschman's analysis confirms the relative unimportance of shareholder voting. See Easterbrook &
Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 17.
64. Commentators frequently argue that institutional investors and other money managers default in their obligations or otherwise act to the detriment of investors by not taking
more of an interest in corporate governance. See CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 5,
at 22; Curzan & Pelesh, Revitalizing CorporateDemocracy: Control of Investment Managers' Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues, 93 HARv. L. REV. 670, 671, 683-87 (1980).
Proponents of these proposals misunderstand the economics of the corporate form of firm
organization and shareholder voting. Professional investors are presumably in a better position than reformers or regulators to decide whether devotion of more resources to voting will
increase their welfare and that of their beneficiaries. In light of the market in shares, the
failure to devote more resources to voting is perfectly consistent with profit maximization.
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as if selling one's shares were somehow immoral or disloyal. The
former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, for
example, has disparagingly characterized this type of investor as
an opportunist who is "nothing more than a short-term speculator
in the Company's income stream. '6 5 This statement, and others
like it, 66 demonstrate a striking lack of understanding of the importance and operation of markets in the protection of investors.
The professional investor who seeks out information about different firms and buys and sells accordingly contributes to an efficient
stock market in which prices incorporate available information.
This in turn ensures that the market for capital and corporate control as well as the market for managerial services will function
smoothly. These markets are essential in minimizing the divergence of interests between managers and shareholders, and operate
to the benefit of uninformed long-term investors as well as shortterm "speculators." The ability freely to sell one's shares, therefore, the so-called "Wall Street Rule," is without question the single most important safeguard to all shareholders that managers
will act in their best interests.
B.

ShareholderDemocracy In Action-The Shareholder
ProposalRule

The classic embodiment of shareholder democracy is the
shareholder proposal rule, which gives shareholders the right, subject to some constraints, to include a proposal in the corporation's
proxy materials. 7 Shareholders utilize these proposals relatively
infrequently, and the proposals are overwhelmingly defeated when
utilized. In the last thirty years, I am unaware of a single successful shareholder proposal that was opposed by management; almost
all receive less than five percent of the votes cast."s This, of course,
is hardly surprising in light of the economics of shareholder voting.
Despite this lack of success, virtually all commentators are
lavish in their praise of the shareholder proposal rule. 9 Propo65. WILLIAMS, THE CORPORATION AS A CONTINUING ENTERPRISE, Securities Regulation
Institute, San Diego, Calif., Jan. 22, 1981.
66. See, e.g., Weiss & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 82.
67. The shareholder proposal rule is codified in rule 14a-8 of the federal proxy rules.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1981).
68. The lack of success of shareholder proposals is well known. See CORPORATE AcCOUNTABILITY, supra note 5, at 139; Schwartz & Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC Shareholder ProposalRule, 65 GEO. L.J. 635, 639 n.19 (1977).
69. See CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 5, at 136-39; Black, Shareholder Democracy and Corporate Governance,5 SEc. REG. L.J. 291, 297-99 (1978); Schwartz & Weiss,
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nents have advanced two arguments in support of the rule. First,
they contend that the rule gives shareholders a needed outlet to
express their views. Second, they argue that it "sensitizes" management to shareholder concerns about social responsibility and,
70
therefore, has a "healthy indirect impact" on corporate behavior.
Neither argument withstands analysis.
No one proposes to deny shareholders who desire to express
their views an opportunity to do so. The problem arises because
the shareholder proposal rule allows them to do so costlessly with
the costs borne by the firm, or, more realistically, by other investors. Not even the first amendment, except in very limited circumstances concerning broadcast frequencies, 7 1 ensures a right to
speech at someone else's expense. The issue in terms of shareholders' welfare is whether individual shareholders would contract for
the right to be able to express their views in a shareholder proposal
if each shareholder also had to pay a subsidy to any other shareholder who wanted to take advantage of the same opportunity. In
light of the economics of shareholder voting (confirmed by the lack
of any shareholder interest in shareholder proposals), and the relative ease of selling in the market if dissatisfied, the rule clearly
cannot be reconciled with the goal of maximizing shareholders'
welfare.
The "healthy indirect impact" argument is even more troublesome. While it is true that corporations have taken actions similar
to those suggested by shareholder proposals both before and after
a proposal's defeat, whether the action was a result of the proposal
or general public sentiment is only conjecture. But let us assume a
corporation decides to modify its behavior-say, discontinuing investment in South Africa or ceasing manufacture of war munitions-in direct response to a defeated proposal. While reformers
would no doubt be ecstatic about this result, shareholders as a
class have little to be excited about. What has occurred is that a
tiny minority, subsidized by the vast majority of shareholders, has
caused the corporation to abandon a wealth-maximizing strategy
favored by the very majority of shareholders who are forced to provide the subsidy. A less "democratic" result or one more inconsistent with the goal of maximizing shareholders' welfare is hard to
imagine.
supra note 68, at 685-86.
70. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 337 (1980).
71. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
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C. Are Shareholders The Intended Beneficiaries of
ShareholderDemocracy?
The gap between the rhetoric and the reality under the shareholder proposal rule raises the question whether shareholders are
the intended beneficiaries of shareholder democracy. Other examples of regulation that appeared to ensure more shareholder democracy illustrate the problem. For example, during the 1970's the
Securities and Exchange Commission began requiring disclosure by
corporations of illegal and perceived antisocial conduct such as
sensitive foreign payments and noncompliance with environmental
laws. 2 This qualitative (as opposed to quantitative) disclosure was
required without any pretense that the information was relevant to
the economics of the investment decision.
This required disclosure is hard to reconcile with the goal of
maximizing shareholders' welfare. Disclosure is costly, and the
firm's existing investors bear these costs. Prohibiting sensitive payments and having a clean environment are undoubtedly of great
interest to some, but not to investors qua investors. To the extent
investors would care at all, they in all probability would favor
practices that maximize the economic return on their investment.
They certainly would not be in favor of subsidizing the disclosure
of moral and political information that is designed to make it less
likely that the corporation will engage in profit-maximizing
behavior.
Shareholders, thus, are far more likely to be the victims rather
than the beneficiaries of much of what masquerades as shareholder
democracy. The real beneficiaries appear to be academics, social
reformers, and regulators who want corporations to sacrifice wealth
maximization in favor of their own notions of moral behavior.
While much legislation is based on such moral notions, it is a sham
to pursue these goals through the corporate machinery in the name
of either shareholders or of democracy.
VI.

INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS

The perceived problems of the governance of the modern publicly held corporations have led to a variety of proposals for restructuring the board of directors. Harold Williams, the former
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, for exam72. For a critical discussion of these required disclosures, see R.

KARMEL, REGULATION

BY PROSECUTION 230-45 (1982).
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ple, has proposed that all directors be independent of management
with the only exception being the chief executive officer who could
not serve as chairman of the board.73 Although this proposal has
not attracted a great deal of adherents, the notion of independent
directors has achieved wide acclaim. Thus, the American Bar Association, 74 The Business Roundtable5 and the Securities and Exchange Commission"6 all have recommended that boards of directors should be composed of a majority of independent directors.
The first draft of the American Law Institute project has gone further and has proposed that corporations be required to have
boards with a majority of independent directors.7 The primary
function of independent directors under these proposals would be
to "monitor" management as opposed to running the business on a
daily basis.7 8 Thus, directors would be empowered to select and fire
managers, review and approve major corporate decisions, hold
management accountable for producing adequate operating results,
and institute compliance programs to ensure that management
79
comply with applicable law and avoid self-dealing.
The same organizations and commentators who have advocated boards of independent directors also have placed great
weight on audit, nominating and compensation committees. Each
of these committees, reformers argue, should consist entirely of independent directors. The primary function of the audit committee
would be to select the independent auditor, supervise the relationship between the firm and the independent auditor, and choose appropriate accounting principles. The nominating committee would
evaluate candidates for directorships and monitor the performance
of existing directors. The compensation committee would determine the compensation of senior management. Faith in the
salutory effect of these committees is so strong that the draft of
the American Law Institute project has proposed that publicly
73. Harold M. Williams, Corporate Accountability and Corporate Power (Oct. 24,
1979) (paper presented at Fairless Lecture Series, Carnegie-Mellon University), discussed in

Kripke,
74.
75.
76.

supra note 50, at 178.
See Overview Committee, supra note 55, at 1844, 1849, 1854.
See Business Roundtable, supra note 55, at 2108.
CORPORATE AccouNTAmLrrY, supra note 5, at 581.

77. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, § 3.03, at 71.
78. Professor Eisenberg originated the concept of the monitoring model. See M. EiSENBERO, supra note 54.
79. Id.; see PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, § 3.02, at 57-70.

HeinOnline -- 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1281 1982

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1282

[Vol. 35:1259

held corporations be required to have audit and nominating committees consisting entirely of independent directors.80 These proposals are evaluated below.
A.

Independent Directors and Shareholders' Welfare

Unlike the arguments for shareholder democracy, a plausible
case can be made that boards dominated by independent directors
will increase shareholders' welfare. The reduction of agency costs
benefits both managers and shareholders alike. Managers can obtain higher salaries from the gains; shareholders' wealth is increased if divergences of interest are minimized. Conceivably, both
parties may increase their welfare by the hiring of independent directors as monitors to scrutinize the behavior of managers.8 1
But costs, both direct and indirect, as well as potential benefits also must be considered. The most obvious direct cost is the
cost of salaries, staffs, and increased layers of bureaucracy. Indirect
costs, however, probably are more important. Proponents of independent directors draw a sharp distinction between running the
business, concededly beyond the competence of independent directors, and various monitoring functions such as choosing managers
and approving major corporate plans. This distinction, however, is
more apparent than real. Directors whose lack of familiarity and
expertise makes them incapable of making ordinary business decisions are presumably even more incapable of making truly important decisions such as deciding whether a merger or development
of a new product should go forward or whether the chief executive
officer and other senior management should be replaced. Involvement of independent directors in these areas, therefore, may be
limited to acting as a rubber stamp of decisions made by those who
are more knowledgeable.8 2 Alternatively, the firm's decisionmaking
may become more cumbersome and less efficient.
Even with respect to deterring self-dealing, the effect of independent directors is unclear. For all but the most obvious frauds,
independent directors, who typically serve part-time and have little or no financial stake in the firm, probably will not make a dif80. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND REcoMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, § § 3.05-.06, at 82-106. The Restatement recommends compensa-

tion committees "as a matter of good corporate practice," but does not require them. Id., §
3.07, at 106-15.
81. See Fama, supra note 15.
82. See Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?,
95 HARv. L. REV. 597, 632-39 (1982).
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ference5 3 Indeed, one may argue that management directors, particuarly the chief executive officer, will be even more dominant and
less accountable, whether in terms of setting salaries or structuring
self-interested transactions with the firm, if a majority of the board
consists of independent directors who lack the knowledge and incentive to challenge senior management."
A convincing theoretical case cannot be made, therefore, that
a board composed of a majority of independent directors will increase shareholders' welfare, and no empirical evidence exists to
support this view. Much the same is true with respect to the various committees that have been proposed. Audit and compensation
committees may improve monitoring of senior management, but
they also may impose costs with no corresponding benefit. Investors may not benefit, for example, from improved accounting principles fomulated by audit committees if they were able to make
intelligent investment decisions under the old procedures.8 5 Similarly, market constraints and the incentive of managers to monitor
each other may be more effective in setting salaries than a committee of uninformed independent directors. Nominating committees
almost surely impose costs without any corresponding benefit. Because the creation of these committees is premised on the misguided notion that steps must be taken to increase shareholder democracy, they are likely to be ignored by investors. To the extent
that these committees function to frustrate the expectations of
those such as controlling shareholders with a large financial stake
in the firm by preventing them from placing their nominees on the
board, shareholders' welfare will be reduced."
In light of the tenuous case for independent directors both on
83. Id. at 607-30. While I agree with Professor Brudney that independent directors are
likely to have minimal impact in improving efficiency and reducing self-dealing, I do not
agree with his conclusion that their inadequacy is a justification for increased regulation of
corporations. Brudney, in my view, like the proponents of the need for improved corporate
governance, wrongly assumes that a problem exists in the way corporations currently are
being run.
84. See Letts, Corporate Governance: A Different Slant, 35 Bus. LAW. 1505, 1509-15
(1980).
85. Several studies have concluded that accounting changes in which real earnings are
not affected do not fool investors-they do not cause investors to reevaluate the prospects of
the firm. E.g., Hong, Kaplan & Mandelker, Pooling vs. Purchase:The Effects of Accounting
for Mergers on Stock Prices, 53 AccT. REV. 31 (1978); Sunder, Relationships Between Accounting Changes and Stock Prices: Problems of Measurement and Some Empirical Evidence, 11 J. AccT. REsEARcH 138 (Supp. 1973).
86. Potential tender offerors, for example, will be deterred from going forward if they
are unable to assume control of the board after gaining control. This deterrent effect will
reduce shareholders' welfare. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 1182-88.
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the board and in various committees, no basis exists for assuming,
let alone mandating, that corporations should be organized in a
particular manner. A far preferable course would be to allow private parties to organize in whatever manner they wish. If the structure advocated by reformers really will increase shareholders' welfare, it will be undertaken voluntarily, 7 just as firms have always
voluntarily hired independent accountants to verify representations made to investors. Firms that are organized in a manner that
maximizes investors' welfare are at an advantage in attracting capital, and managers of such firms will maximize the value of their
own services. Conversely, firms that fail to adopt a governance
structure that increases shareholders' welfare will be targets of
takeovers. These incentives to maximize the value of the
firm-much more than legal rules that are based on a shaky theoretical foundation and not supported by any empirical evidence-are likely to result in a firm structure that maximizes investors' welfare.88
B. Is There a Hidden Agenda?
Thus far I have analyzed proposals for independent directors
as if they have been motivated by a desire to maximize investors'
wealth. The possibility remains, however, that furtherance of the
public interest, however defined, is the main reason for the popularity of independent directors for at least some of the proponents.89 Independent directors are desirable under this view not
because they have the effect of ensuring more effective performance by managers, but because their presence will cause the firm to
87. The number of boards composed of a majority of independent directors has increased dramatically in the last ten years, and this is some evidence that independent directors are beneficial. The significance of the development, however, is obscured because many
companies changed their boards in response to exhortations by the SEC that threatened
mandatory action if steps were not undertaken voluntarily. See Kripke, supra note 50, at
189-92.
88. For a similar analysis that managers have strong incentives to choose a dividend
policy that maximizes investors' welfare, see Fischel, The Law and Economics of Dividend
Policy, supra note 22, at 1165-68. See also Fischel, supra note 58 (managers have incentive
to incorporate in state that maximizes the wealth of investors).
89. For a forceful argument that this is the case, see Wolfson, SEC Thinking and
Lessons in Bureaucratizingthe Corporation,in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 32, at
9 (independent directors will be less entrepreneurial and will define success, not by increasing profits, but by "the approbation of government regulators like the SEC and special interest 'do-good' groups."). For a critique of former Chairman Williams' views that independent directors should be responsible to a wide range of constituencies, see Kripke, supra
note 50, at 180-86.
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be more sensitive about concerns such as pollution, foreign payments, and minority employment. The lack of competence and incentive to maximize shareholders' wealth is now no longer a drawback but a strength because the very purpose of independent
directors is to temper managements' single-minded pursuit of
profits.
Consider the use by the Securities and Exchange Commission
of injunctive remedies requiring the installation of independent directors and audit committees as a means of settling investigations
regarding questionable foreign payments and other alleged unethical or illegal practices.90 Since the challenged practices in all
probability benefited investors, the intent, and presumably the effect of the relief sought by the SEC was to subordinate investors'
welfare in favor of making the corporation behave more morally.
This emphasis on compliance with law and ethical standards of behavior is a recurrent theme of proposals for independent
directors. 1
Use of independent directors for this purpose raises a variety
of problems such as what special competence do independent directors have to determine what the public interest is and the lack
of any principle to define when and to what extent profit maximization must be sacrificed to other goals.'2 Although these
problems are intractable in themselves, my objection is more fundamental, albeit related. Requiring that boards be dominated by
independent directors to compel corporations to behave in a more
"socially responsible" way has the effect of obliterating the distinction between a firm-a nexus of contracts voluntarily and lawfully
entered into by individuals to maximize their joint welfare-and a
public body serving the public interest such as an administrative
agency. In evaluating alternative courses of action boards of directors, under this latter approach, would not strive to determine
what alternative maximizes wealth, but rather what alternative
furthers the public interest, much in the same way that the Federal Communications Commission determines which potential
90. For a discussion of this practice and a summary of the relevant literature, see
Note, The SEC and Court-Appointed Directors: Time to Tailor the Director to Fit the
Suit, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 507 (1982).
91. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, §§ 3.01-.08, at 45-125; Dent, supra note 1, at 661-80; Small, The
Evolving Role of the Director in Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1355, 1374

(1979).
92.

See Brudney, supra note 82, at 639-56.

HeinOnline -- 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1285 1982

1286

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1259

broadcast licensee will best serve the public interest.9 3 Since private parties have shown no interest in abandoning the corporate
form of firm organization dedicated to wealth maximization in
favor of such quasi-public institutions, they presumably must be
coerced. Perhaps this is the real reason why certain reformers, who
have been unsuccessful in implementing their objectives through
the democratic process, are so insistent on mandatory changes in
the structure of corporations.
VII.

INCREASING THE LIALITY FACED BY CORPORATE MANAGERS

Proponents of the need for improved corporate governance are
skeptical of the ability and incentive of corporate managers to act
in investors' best interests. Some have argued, for example, that
managers make business decisions without marshalling adequate
material information. The number of cases in which directors or
officers have been found liable for negligence, or breach of the duty
of care, however, is extremely small.' 5 When derivative suits are
brought for breach of duty of care or loyalty, they frequently are
dismissed.
Many reformers find this situation unsatisfactory. They claim
that "effective duty of care provisions are critical to the proper
functioning of modern corporate governance."' 6 Advocates of this
view argue that legislatures and courts must set high standards of
care for corporate managers to improve corporate accountability
and not allow directors to escape liability under the business judgment rule. 7 Further, advocates of corporate reform have argued
that the derivative suit also must be strengthened so that manag93. For a discussion of the difficulties faced by administrative agencies in applying a
public interest standard, see Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Processes: An Application of
Public Choice Theory to Bakke, The FCC, and the Courts, 88 YALE L.J. 717 (1979). These
difficulties, if anything, would be even greater in the corporate context because of the lack of
any mechanism for enforcing a public interest standard.
94. See PINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRucTuRE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, § 4.01, commentary at 145.
95. See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification
of CorporateDirectorsand Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968) (a "search for cases in
which directors of industrial corporations have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very
large haystack.").
96. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOvERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, pt. IV, introductory note, at 128.
97. See id.; CORPORATE AccouNTABrnIuY, supra note 5, at

690 ("Both state legislatures
and state courts have important roles to play in promoting corporate accountability. The
legislature can set standards of director conduct at a high, yet reasonable level ....
Courts
...can respond in this direction."); Dent, supra note 1, at 654-61.
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ers who breach duties owed to shareholders are held accountable.9 8
In response to these concerns, the first draft of the corporate
governance project of the American Law Institute has proposed revitalizing legal constraints on managements' behavior. To ensure
that the fear of liability will provide managers' with an incentive to
act in investors' best interests, the project curtails the protection
traditionally afforded under the business judgment rule. Thus the
project provides that the rule will operate only when directors specifically, attentively, and directly focused on the decisions under
review. ' Decisions that are "nondeliberative" are not protected.
Even decisions in which the requisite procedural requirements
have been met are not protected if they lack a "rational basis."100
To ensure an adequate enforcement mechanism if the duty of care
or loyalty is breached, the project makes it virtually impossible for
the corporation to dismiss a derivative suit challenging particular
conduct unless the decision is made by independent directors with
separate counsel and documented in a thorough written report.101
These proposals are evaluated below.
A. The Business Judgment Rule and the Importance of the
Market as Opposed to Legal Mechanisms in Reducing Agency
Costs
Because proponents of the need for improved corporate governance ignore the various market incentives for managers to act in
the best interests of shareholders, they believe that strong legal
rules regulating managerial behavior are necessary to avoid exploitation of investors. This belief has been responsible for the
widely held (but implausible) view that states have been engaged
in a "race to the bottom" in enacting enabling statutes which, by
failing to regulate, operate to the detriment of investors. 0 2 The
98. See

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRucTURE: RESTATEMENT AND

RECOMMENDATIONS,

supra note 6, pt. VII, introductory note, at 217-23; Coffee & Schwartz,

The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluationand a Proposalfor Legislative Reform,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 302 (1981); Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder
Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96, 144-45 (1980).

99. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 133.
100. Id., § 4.01, at 141.
101.

Id., § 7.03, at 295-303.

102. Professor Cary popularized the "race to the bottom" thesis. See Cary, supra note
20. For a persuasive demonstration that managers have no incentive to incorporate in states
that minimize the wealth of investors, and could not even if they wanted to without suffering various market penalties, such as the refusal of investors to invest in those firms, see R.
WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 9-11 (1978). Winter's thesis is confirmed em-
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same notion is responsible for the proposals to increase the liability faced by managers by narrowing the business judgment rule
and strengthening the derivative suit.
No basis exists for the assumption that the absence of regulatory constraints will operate to the detriment of investors. On the
contrary, the discipline exerted by product and capital markets,
the market for managerial services, and the market for corporate
control serverely limits the divergence of interest between managers and investors.103 An understanding of this relative harmony of
interests between managers and shareholders clarifies both the rationale of the business judgment rule and the danger created by
limiting its operation.
There is no reason to believe that courts can systematically
improve on the business decisions made by corporate managers.
Courts (and shareholders) do not possess the experience, expertise,
or information necessary to make complicated business decisions.
Even if courts did possess these attributes, they still would be inferior decisionmakers because they are not constrained by market
forces as are corporate managers. The judge who makes a bad business decisibn is not likely to decrease the market value of his services or risk a takeover in the same way that a corporate manager
would.
The business judgment rule embodies these principles.1 '
Under the rule courts will not second-guess business decisions
made by corporate managers except in the most extreme situations. The rule implicitly recognizes, therefore, that shareholders'
welfare is maximized if managers, constrained by markets, make
business decisions rather than shareholders or courts. Thus the
small number of cases in which courts have second-guessed decipirically in Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980) (share prices go up when firms
reincorporate in Delaware). See also Fischel, supra note 58.
103. Proponents of increased legal intervention do not seem to fully understand the
effect of these market mechanisms. The draft of the ALI project, for example, states that
"[m]arket mechanisms, even if they were fully effective in holding corporate management
accountable for efficiency, are unlikely to be effective in regulating such matters as managerial conflicts of interest, since many self-interested transactions are not sufficiently material
in dollar terms to have significant impact on share prices." PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GovERNANCE AND STRucTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 62. This
statement is nonsensical. If the only situation in which market mechanisms do not hold
managers fully "accountable" is the situation in which no significant impact on share prices
occurs, why worry?
104. For a fuller discussion of the business judgment rule, see Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 13, at 1195-97.
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sions by corporate managers is in no way a problem. On the contrary, shareholders almost surely would lose more than they would
gain if courts became more actively involved in corporate
decisionmaking.
For these reasons shareholders' welfare would be reduced if
the business judgment rule were eroded as proposed by some reformers. Consider the provision in the draft of the American Law
Institute (ALI) project that decisions will be protected by the business judgment rule only if they result from a deliberative process.
What if directors, by virtue of their experience and expertise, are
able to make a decision without deliberating at all? Making the
decision in this manner, which may appear to be casual to a court,
maximizes shareholders' welfare. The costs of gathering and
processing information are real costs that should be avoided if they
are not justified by anticipated benefits from improved decisionmaking. The managers themselves, not the courts, are best able to
determine whether limited resources should be allocated to information gathering or for other purposes. The business judgment
rule should shield the procedure for making a decision, as well as
the substance of the decision itself, from judicial review. But if the
rule only is available when a "deliberative" decision is made, directors will have an incentive to incur costs for gathering information
and documenting their decisions even when it is not cost-justified
to do so. Shareholders will be the losers.
Much the same is true with the "rational basis" test. It is
much too easy for a court, acting after a decision has gone wrong,
to conclude that the decision lacked a rational basis or could have
been improved upon if more information were gathered. In light of
the various market incentives to operate efficiently and keep share
prices high, there does not appear to be any need for a process of
judicial review that is incapable of identifying or correcting inefficient decisionmaking. By implicitly recognizing the inability of the
courts to improve on the business decisions made by managers disciplined by markets, the business judgment rule contributes to the
efficient management that shareholders desire.
Other proposals in the draft of the ALI project that are
designed to increase the potential liability of directors are equally
objectionable. The project, for example, precludes contractual variation of liability standards. As an illustration, the drafters would
not allow a director with expertise in banking to limit his involvement to banking matters, even with the full consent of the board.
His failure to be involved in other areas would, according to the
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drafters, constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.10 5 It is hard to see
what could possibly be gained by this highly regulatory approach
to board composition and liability standards. Members of the
board involved in running the corporation's affairs no doubt have a
better sense for the optimal specialization of functions among
managers, including such decisions as whether it is desirable to
have a director with banking expertise on the board, than do regulators and reformers. Prohibiting private parties from entering into
such voluntary arrangements for their mutual benefit will reduce
shareholders' welfare.
Similarly, the project strongly suggests that compliance with
the duty of care requires managers to install "law compliance programs" even when these programs are not cost justified.1 0 The rationale for special emphasis on compliance with law is unclear.
Managers have strong incentives to minimize fines or other consequences of regulatory violations for the same reason that they have
incentives to minimize all other costs. But if the expected costs of
fines are less than the costs of installing compliance programs, the
proper course to maximize shareholders' wealth is to do nothing
10 7
and pay the fines.
B.

Strengthening the Derivative Suit

The same disregard of the effect of markets and overemphasis
on legal mechanisms in regulating managerial conduct explains the
resurgence of interest in the derivative suit as a monitoring device.
Certainly instances of blatant self-dealing or other one-time defalcations may occur in which the derivative suit may play a role in
deterring misconduct. But the importance of the derivative suit
should not be exaggerated. In most situations the derivative suit is
ineffective in reducing agency costs. Management that consumes
excessive leisure or is not sufficiently diligent in choosing projects,
or otherwise does not maximize shareholders' wealth in any of an
infinite number of ways short of fraud, has little to fear from the
derivative suit. Shareholders and courts, unlike markets, are unable to detect these forms of nonwealth-maximizing behavior.
Another important distinction exists between the operation of
105. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, § 401 commentary, at 154-55.

106. Id. at 178.
107. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963)
(holding that directors were not liable for failing to prevent the imposition of fines by installing compliance programs when it was not cost-justified to do so).
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markets and the derivative suit in reducing agency costs. Markets
operate automatically and at minimal cost to the firm's investors.
The costs incurred by potential takeover bidders to identify mismanaged firms, for example, in no way reduce the wealth of investors of targets. By contrast, the derivative suit imposes significant
costs on the firm's investors, the supposed beneficiaries of the action. At the very least, the costs of lawyers' and managers' time
diverted from profitable ventures must be borne by the firm's investors. Moreover, shareholders (or their attorneys) may not be
able to, nor even have the incentive to, identify conduct that is
detrimental to investors. For example, a derivative suit to enjoin
conduct that increases investors' wealth such as the making of foreign payments imposes obvious costs on investors. Even in situations in which shareholders through their attorneys have correctly
identified nonwealth-maximizing behavior, a derivative suit may
still impose costs on investors that outweigh any benefits if, for
example, the same deterrent effect could be accomplished by other
(less costly) means such as a reduction in salary or bonus.
These costs of the derivative suit, and the inferiority of the
derivative suit as compared to market mechanisms in reducing
agency costs, suggest that its importance has been greatly exaggerted and cast doubt on proposals to strengthen it further.10 8 Requiring that management go through a complicated procedure involving hiring new personnel and the compilation of detailed
written reports whenever a suit is filed, for example, increases the
costs borne by the firm's investors without any assurance that their
expenditures are cost-justified. And allowing a derivative suit to go
forward because it furthers a federal or state "public policy," even
though shareholders welfare is decreased, forces investors to subsidize litigation that operates to their detriment through a tool that
is supposedly designed for their benefit. Thus legal rules making it
more difficult and costly to dismiss derivative suits are extremely
unlikely to increase shareholders' welfare. Absent any evidence
that such costs are justified by the existence of a problem, the burden of establishing that they should be incurred has not been met.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Despite the near consensus that improved corporate governance is necessary, critics have proffered no evidence to demonstrate that any problem exists. Many reformers, as their proposals
108. See Fischel, supra note 58, at 941.
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reflect, either ignore or misunderstand the economics of the corporate form of firm organization and the market forces that limit the
divergence of interest between managers and investors. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the corporate governance movement, despite its durability and widely held support, is much ado
about nothing.
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